Pak-Afghan ties worsened
under the Taliban regime

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By Abdul Basit Khan

CONTRARY to general expectations, Pakistan-Afghanistan ties have deteriorated under the Taliban’s interim regime. In August 2021, the Taliban’s return to power was widely hailed as a strategic victory for Pakistan. Islamabad facilitated US-Taliban negotiations, resulting in the Doha Agreement 2020, which paved the way for the former’s withdrawal and the latter’s return to power in Afghanistan. Since then, the Taliban have not only dashed Pakistani hopes of cooperation and exhibited strategic autonomy in foreign policy, but in some respects, they have been more extreme in opposing Pakistani interests and concerns as compared to their predecessors.

On September 14, Pakistani and Taliban soldiers exchanged fire after a dispute over the border fence construction, resulting in casualties on both sides. More recently, the Taliban objected to Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) speech and demanded an unconditional apology. In his speech, Sharif expressed concerns over continued sanctuaries of various terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Rejecting Pakistani apprehensions, the Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid upheld that Sharif’s concerns of terrorism (to other countries) from Afghanistan are based on incorrect information. He said, “Rather than raising unsubstantiated concerns and allegations, the world should engage positively with the Islamic Emirate by sharing their view and concerns directly and not through the media or public statements.”

Similarly, tensions have been rising between both countries over the whereabouts of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) chief Maulana Masood Azhar. In January, Pakistan wrote to the Taliban to locate, arrest and handover Azhar. However, the Taliban rejected Islamabad’s claim maintaining that there was no reason for Azhar to be in Afghanistan. On September 14 however, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated the demand noting that Azhar could be living in eastern Afghanistan’s Kunar or Nangarhar provinces where JeM is believed to have eight camps. Once again, Zabiullah rebuffed the Pakistani demand maintaining, “Jaish-e-Mohammad chief is not in Afghanistan. Such organizations can operate on Pakistan’s soil – and even under official patronage.” Likewise, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned Pakistan to refrain from such accusations which could adversely affect bilateral relations.

Besides, TTP’s presence in Afghanistan and its use of Afghan soil for attacks against Pakistani security forces has also strained bilateral relations. The Taliban have not only refused to cooperate against TTP but termed it Pakistan’s internal matter. In a media interview last August, Zabiullah said that it was up to Pakistan to decide how it wanted to deal with TTP. At the same time, he offered mediation to both sides to settle their differences politically. Last November, Pakistan and TTP reached a one-month cease-fire as a confidence building measure to start a formal peace process. However, TTP unilaterally scrapped the truce in December and resumed its attacks. Another push to kickstart the talks resulted in an indefinite cease-fire from TTP in June and a protracted peace process. In this second round of peace talks, delegations from the Pakistani security institutions, tribal elders from the ex-FATA region and Malakand Division and the political leaders met with TTP representatives in Kabul. However, peace talks were disrupted in July following the killing of Al-Qaeda chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri in a US drone attack in Kabul as well as four TTP leaders in different parts of Afghanistan.

In the aftermath of Zawahiri’s killing, the Taliban accused Pakistan of allowing US drones to use its airspace for strikes in Kabul. Since then, the Taliban have been occupied in dealing with the repercussions of Zawahiri’s killing and did not take a keen interest in facilitating further meetings between Pakistan and TTP. Rather, TTP has resumed its attacks against Pakistan under the pretext of defensive or retaliatory attacks.

Another constant source of friction since the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan has been the fencing of the Pak-Afghan border. In fact, unlike other Afghan regimes, the Taliban have physically obstructed the border fence construction on multiple occasions and engaged in skirmishes with Pakistani troops, resulting in intermittent border closures. Like other Afghan regimes, the Taliban have refused to acknowledge the Pak-Afghan frontier as an international recognized border. They consider it an imaginary line of the colonial era which divided the Pashtun community of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

To Pakistan’s frustration, the Taliban have also engaged with India to forge a working relationship. The Taliban have urged India to resume its development projects in Afghanistan and assured it of complete security. On August 15, after a year of suspension, India reopened its embassy in Kabul and resumed regular consular work. 

As long as Pakistan’s terrorism-related concerns in Afghanistan remain unaddressed and the US-Pakistan ties are on the rebound, Afghanistan-Pakistan ties are likely to stay tense for the foreseeable future. If a satisfactory answer to TTP’s challenge is not worked out, tensions will persist. Despite these tensions, both Pakistan and Afghanistan will stay engaged and muddle through the challenges confronting the bilateral ties.

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(The author is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Twitter @basitresearcher.)